Injunction to prevent enforcement of an English judgment overseas

It is well established that the English court has the power to grant an anti-enforcement injunction (AEI) to restrain a party from seeking to enforce a foreign judgment, in much the same way that the court has the power to grant an anti-suit injunction to restrain a party from pursuing foreign proceedings. 

Whilst some modern authorities have sought to confine AEIs to cases where it is alleged that the foreign judgment was obtained by fraud (as opposed to cases where the foreign judgment has been obtained in breach of a jurisdiction or arbitration agreement, which is the context in which most anti-suit injunctions are granted), the court in Google v Tsargrad [2025] EWHC 94 (Comm) held that the jurisdiction to grant an AEI is not so limited. Nevertheless, an AEI (like an anti-suit injunction) does have the effect of indirectly interfering in the processes of a foreign court, and hence a clear justification is required, which means that AEIs are rarely granted.

In what is believed to be the first case of its kind, the Commercial Court (Henshaw J) has handed down judgment in Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) v Williams [2025] EWHC 2217 (Comm) in which an AEI was granted to restrain the defendant from enforcing the judgment of an English court (as opposed to an injunction restraining the enforcement of a foreign judgment).

The judgment in question was a US$15 million default judgment granted by Moulder J in favour of Dr Williams against the FGN in November 2018. The FGN applied to have the judgment set aside, but that application was dismissed by Bright J in November 2023. In the meantime, Dr Williams had commenced proceedings in New York seeking to have the judgment recognised and to enforce it there.

In July 2024, the FGN commenced fresh proceedings in England seeking to have the default judgment set aside on the grounds that it had been obtained as a result of fraud on the court. Having already applied (unsuccessfully) to have the judgment set aside, Dr Williams applied to have these new proceedings struck out as an abuse of process, but that application was dismissed by Henshaw J in May 2025.

The FGN subsequently applied for an AEI to restrain the New York enforcement proceedings, arguing that it was vexatious and oppressive for Dr Williams to seek to enforce a judgment which the FGN alleged had been obtained by fraud. However, unless and until it is set aside, the default judgment remains a binding and conclusive judgment of the English court and so the question arose as to whether Dr Williams could be prevented from continuing with the New York enforcement proceedings pending the determination of the FGN’s claim to have the judgment set aside. 

In his judgment handed down on 26 August 2025, Henshaw J held (at [15]) that there was no principled reason why an AEI could not be granted to prevent Dr Williams from seeking to enforce an English judgment. Notwithstanding the delay on the part of the FGN in bringing the proceedings to have the default judgment set aside, the judge held (at [20]) that the FGN had a strong prima facie case on the merits and, accordingly, that there was a compelling case for granting an AEI.

As well as dealing with jurisdiction to grant an AEI, the judgment will be of wider interest to those applying for anti-suit injunctions on non-contractual grounds (i.e. on the grounds that the foreign proceedings are vexatious and oppressive as opposed to the proceedings being brought in breach of a jurisdiction or arbitration agreement). The judgment contains an interesting discussion as to the test to be applied where an anti-suit injunction is sought on a non-contractual basis.

In an earlier case (Investcom Global Ltd v PLC Investments Ltd [2024] EWHC 2505 (Comm)), Henshaw J had accepted a submission that the usual test for a non-contractual anti-suit injunction is the American Cyanamid one requiring demonstration of a serious issue to be tried. However, in this recent judgment, Henshaw J explained (at [17]) that, having heard submissions on the point, he no longer considered that to be the correct approach. 

Even where an anti-suit injunction is sought on an interim basis, the reality is that, if granted, the injunction will usually be determinative of where the substantive issue will be tried. Accordingly, rather than applying the “serious issue to be tried” test (which is a relatively low bar), Henshaw J held that the applicant is generally required to show at the interim stage that there is a “high probability” of a final injunction being granted at trial, i.e. the same test which is applied where an anti-suit injunction is sought on a contractual basis. 

The judgment is available here.

Edward Levey KC instructed by Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP is acting for the Federal Government of Nigeria and the Attorney General of Nigeria in these proceedings.